Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America

Anibal Quijano

What is termed globalization is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power. One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classification of the world’s population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism. The racial axis has a colonial origin and character, but it has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established. Therefore, the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality. In what follows, my primary aim is to open up some of the theoretically necessary questions about the implications of coloniality of power regarding the history of Latin America.1

America and the New Model of Global Power

America2 was constituted as the first space/time of a new model of power of global vocation, and both in this way and by it became the first identity of modernity. Two historical processes associated in the production of that space/time converged and established the two fundamental axes of the new model of power. One was the codification of the differences between conquerors and conquered in the idea of “race,” a supposedly different biological structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority to the others. The conquistadors assumed this idea as the constitutive, founding element of the relations of domination that the conquest imposed. On
this basis, the population of America, and later the world, was classified within the new model of power. The other process was the constitution of a new structure of control of labor and its resources and products. This new structure was an articulation of all historically known previous structures of control of labor, slavery, serfdom, small independent commodity production and reciprocity, together around and upon the basis of capital and the world market.³

**Race: A Mental Category of Modernity**

The idea of race, in its modern meaning, does not have a known history before the colonization of America. Perhaps it originated in reference to the phenotypic differences between conquerors and conquered.⁴ However, what matters is that soon it was constructed to refer to the supposed differential biological structures between those groups.

Social relations founded on the category of race produced new historical social identities in America—Indians, blacks, and mestizos—and redefined others. Terms such as Spanish and Portuguese, and much later European, which until then indicated only geographic origin or country of origin, acquired from then on a racial connotation in reference to the new identities. Insofar as the social relations that were being configured were relations of domination, such identities were considered constitutive of the hierarchies, places, and corresponding social roles, and consequently of the model of colonial domination that was being imposed. In other words, race and racial identity were established as instruments of basic social classification.

As time went by, the colonizers codified the phenotypic trait of the colonized as color, and they assumed it as the emblematic characteristic of racial category. That category was probably initially established in the area of Anglo-America. There so-called blacks were not only the most important exploited group, since the principal part of the economy rested on their labor; they were, above all, the most important colonized race, since Indians were not part of that colonial society. Why the dominant group calls itself “white” is a story related to racial classification.⁵

In America, the idea of race was a way of granting legitimacy to the relations of domination imposed by the conquest. After the colonization of America and the expansion of European colonialism to the rest of the world, the subsequent constitution of Europe as a new id-entity needed the elaboration of a Eurocentric perspective of knowledge, a theoretical perspective on the idea of race as a naturalization of colonial relations between Europeans
and non-Europeans. Historically, this meant a new way of legitimizing the already old ideas and practices of relations of superiority/inferiority between dominant and dominated. From the sixteenth century on, this principle has proven to be the most effective and long-lasting instrument of universal social domination, since the much older principle—gender or intersexual domination—was encroached upon by the inferior/superior racial classifications. So the conquered and dominated peoples were situated in a natural position of inferiority and, as a result, their phenotypic traits as well as their cultural features were considered inferior. In this way, race became the fundamental criterion for the distribution of the world population into ranks, places, and roles in the new society’s structure of power.

**Capitalism, the New Structure for the Control of Labor**

In the historical process of the constitution of America, all forms of control and exploitation of labor and production, as well as the control of appropriation and distribution of products, revolved around the capital-salary relation and the world market. These forms of labor control included slavery, serfdom, petty-commodity production, reciprocity, and wages. In such an assemblage, each form of labor control was no mere extension of its historical antecedents. All of these forms of labor were historically and sociologically new: in the first place, because they were deliberately established and organized to produce commodities for the world market; in the second place, because they did not merely exist simultaneously in the same space/time, but each one of them was also articulated to capital and its market. Thus they configured a new global model of labor control, and in turn a fundamental element of a new model of power to which they were historically structurally dependent. That is to say, the place and function, and therefore the historical movement, of all forms of labor as subordinated points of a totality belonged to the new model of power, in spite of their heterogeneous specific traits and their discontinuous relations with that totality. In the third place, and as a consequence, each form of labor developed into new traits and historical-structural configurations.

Insofar as that structure of control of labor, resources, and products consisted of the joint articulation of all the respective historically known forms, a global model of control of work was established for the first time in known history. And while it was constituted around and in the service of capital, its configuration as a whole was established with a capitalist character as well. Thus emerged a new, original, and singular structure
of relations of production in the historical experience of the world: world capitalism.

Coloniality of Power and Global Capitalism

The new historical identities produced around the foundation of the idea of race in the new global structure of the control of labor were associated with social roles and geohistorical places. In this way, both race and the division of labor remained structurally linked and mutually reinforcing, in spite of the fact that neither of them were necessarily dependent on the other in order to exist or change.

In this way, a systematic racial division of labor was imposed. In the Hispanic region, the Crown of Castilla decided early on to end the enslavement of the Indians in order to prevent their total extermination. They were instead confined to serfdom. For those that lived in communities, the ancient practice of reciprocity—the exchange of labor force and labor without a market—was allowed as a way of reproducing its labor force as serfs. In some cases, the Indian nobility, a reduced minority, was exempted from serfdom and received special treatment owing to their roles as intermediaries with the dominant race. They were also permitted to participate in some of the activities of the nonnoble Spanish. However, blacks were reduced to slavery. As the dominant race, Spanish and Portuguese whites could receive wages, be independent merchants, independent artisans, or independent farmers—in short, independent producers of commodities. Nevertheless, only nobles could participate in the high-to-midrange positions in the military and civil colonial administration.

Beginning in the eighteenth century, in Hispanic America an extensive and important social stratum of mestizos (born of Spanish men and Indian women) began to participate in the same offices and activities as nonnoble Iberians. To a lesser extent, and above all in activities of service or those that required a specialized talent (music, for example), the more "whitened" among the mestizos of black women and Spanish or Portuguese had an opportunity to work. But they were late in legitimizing their new roles, since their mothers were slaves. This racist distribution of labor in the interior of colonial/modern capitalism was maintained throughout the colonial period.

In the course of the worldwide expansion of colonial domination on the part of the same dominant race (or, from the eighteenth century onward, Europeans), the same criteria of social classification were imposed on all of the world population. As a result, new historical and social
identities were produced: yellows and olives were added to whites, Indians, blacks, and mestizos. The racist distribution of new social identities was combined, as had been done so successfully in Anglo-America, with a racist distribution of labor and the forms of exploitation of colonial capitalism. This was, above all, through a quasi-exclusive association of whiteness with wages and, of course, with the high-order positions in the colonial administration. Thus each form of labor control was associated with a particular race. Consequently, the control of a specific form of labor could be, at the same time, the control of a specific group of dominated people. A new technology of domination/exploitation, in this case race/labor, was articulated in such a way that the two elements appeared naturally associated. Until now, this strategy has been exceptionally successful.

Coloniality and the Eurocentrification of World Capitalism
The privileged positions conquered by the dominant whites for the control of gold, silver, and other commodities produced by the unpaid labor of Indians, blacks, and mestizos (coupled with an advantageous location in the slope of the Atlantic through which, necessarily, the traffic of these commodities for the world market had to pass) granted whites a decisive advantage to compete for the control of worldwide commercial traffic. The progressive monetization of the world market that the precious metals from America stimulated and allowed, as well as the control of such large resources, made possible the control of the vast preexisting web of commercial exchange that included, above all, China, India, Ceylon, Egypt, Syria—the future Far and Middle East. The monetization of labor also made it possible to concentrate the control of commercial capital, labor, and means of production in the whole world market.

The control of global commercial traffic by dominant groups headquartered in the Atlantic zones propelled in those places a new process of urbanization based on the expansion of commercial traffic between them, and, consequently, the formation of regional markets increasingly integrated and monetarized due to the flow of precious metals originating in America. A historically new region was constituted as a new geocultural id-entity: Europe—more specifically, Western Europe. A new geocultural identity emerged as the central site for the control of the world market. The hegemony of the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Iberian peninsula was displaced toward the northwest Atlantic coast in the same historical moment.
The condition Europe found itself in as the central site of the new world market cannot explain by itself alone why Europe also became, until the nineteenth century and virtually until the worldwide crisis of 1870, the central site of the process of the commodification of the labor force, while all the rest of the regions and populations colonized and incorporated into the new world market under European dominion basically remained under nonwaged relations of labor. And in non-European regions, wage labor was concentrated almost exclusively among whites. Of course, the entire production of such a division of labor was articulated in a chain of transference of value and profits whose control corresponded to Western Europe.

There is nothing in the social relation of capital itself, or in the mechanisms of the world market in general, that implies the historical necessity of European concentration first (either in Europe or elsewhere) of waged labor and later (over precisely the same base) of the concentration of industrial production for more than two centuries. As events after 1870 demonstrated, Western European control of wage labor in any sector of the world’s population would have been perfectly feasible, and probably more profitable for Western Europe. The explanation ought to lie, then, in some other aspect of history itself.

The fact is that from the very beginning of the colonization of America, Europeans associated nonpaid or nonwaged labor with the dominated races because they were “inferior” races. The vast genocide of the Indians in the first decades of colonization was not caused principally by the violence of the conquest nor by the plagues the conquistadors brought, but took place because so many American Indians were used as disposable manual labor and forced to work until death. The elimination of this colonial practice did not end until the defeat of the encomenderos in the middle of the sixteenth century. The subsequent Iberian colonialism involved a new politics of population reorganization, a reorganization of the Indians and their relations with the colonizers. But this did not advance American Indians as free and waged laborers. From then on, they were assigned the status of unpaid serfs. The serfdom of the American Indians could not, however, be compared with feudal serfdom in Europe, since it included neither the supposed protection of a feudal lord nor, necessarily, the possession of a piece of land to cultivate instead of wages. Before independence, the Indian labor force of serfs reproduced itself in the communities, but more than one hundred years after independence, a large part of the Indian serfs was still obliged to reproduce the labor force on its own.8 The other form of
unwaged or, simply put, unpaid labor, slavery, was assigned exclusively to the “black” population brought from Africa.

The racial classification of the population and the early association of the new racial identities of the colonized with the forms of control of unpaid, unwaged labor developed among the Europeans the singular perception that paid labor was the whites’ privilege. The racial inferiority of the colonized implied that they were not worthy of wages. They were naturally obliged to work for the profit of their owners. It is not difficult to find, to this very day, this attitude spread out among the white property owners of any place in the world. Furthermore, the lower wages “inferior races” receive in the present capitalist centers for the same work as done by whites cannot be explained as detached from the racist social classification of the world’s population—in other words, as detached from the global capitalist coloniality of power.

The control of labor in the new model of global power was constituted thus, articulating all historical forms of labor control around the capitalist wage-labor relation. This articulation was constitutively colonial, based on first the assignment of all forms of unpaid labor to colonial races (originally American Indians, blacks, and, in a more complex way, mestizos) in America and, later on, to the remaining colonized races in the rest of the world, olives and yellows. Second, labor was controlled through the assignment of salaried labor to the colonizing whites.

Coloniality of labor control determined the geographic distribution of each one of the integrated forms of labor control in global capitalism. In other words, it determined the social geography of capitalism: capital, as a social formation for control of wage labor, was the axis around which all remaining forms of labor control, resources, and products were articulated. But, at the same time, capital’s specific social configuration was geographically and socially concentrated in Europe and, above all, among Europeans in the whole world of capitalism. Through these measures, Europe and the European constituted themselves as the center of the capitalist world economy.

When Raúl Prebisch coined the celebrated image of center and periphery to describe the configuration of global capitalism since the end of World War II, he underscored, with or without being aware of it, the nucleus of the historical model for the control of labor, resources, and products that shaped the central part of the new global model of power, starting with America as a player in the new world economy. Global capitalism was, from then on, colonial/modern and Eurocentered. Without a clear
understanding of those specific historical characteristics of capitalism, the concept of a “modern world-system” itself, developed principally by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974–89; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982) but based on Prebisch and on the Marxian concept of world capitalism, cannot be properly or completely understood.

The New Model of World Power and the New World Intersubjectivity

As the center of global capitalism, Europe not only had control of the world market, but it was also able to impose its colonial dominance over all the regions and populations of the planet, incorporating them into its world-system and its specific model of power. For such regions and populations, this model of power involved a process of historical reidentification; from Europe such regions and populations were attributed new geocultural identities. In that way, after America and Europe were established, Africa, Asia, and eventually Oceania followed suit. In the production of these new identities, the coloniality of the new model of power was, without a doubt, one of the most active determinations. But the forms and levels of political and cultural development, and more specifically intellectual development, played a role of utmost importance in each case. Without these factors, the category “Orient” would not have been elaborated as the only one with sufficient dignity to be the other to the “Occident,” although by definition inferior, without some equivalent to “Indians” or “blacks” being coined. But this omission itself puts in the open the fact that those other factors also acted within the racist model of universal social classification of the world population.

The incorporation of such diverse and heterogeneous cultural histories into a single world dominated by Europe signified a cultural and intellectual intersubjective configuration equivalent to the articulation of all forms of labor control around capital, a configuration that established world capitalism. In effect, all of the experiences, histories, resources, and cultural products ended up in one global cultural order revolving around European or Western hegemony. Europe’s hegemony over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony.

During that process, the colonizers exercised diverse operations that brought about the configuration of a new universe of intersubjective relations of domination between Europe and the Europeans and the rest of
the regions and peoples of the world, to whom new geocultural identities were being attributed in that process. In the first place, they expropriated the cultural discoveries of the colonized peoples most apt for the development of capitalism to the profit of the European center. Second, they repressed as much as possible the colonized forms of knowledge production, the models of the production of meaning, their symbolic universe, the model of expression and of objectification and subjectivity. As is well known, repression in this field was most violent, profound, and long lasting among the Indians of Ibero-America, who were condemned to be an illiterate peasant subculture stripped of their objectified intellectual legacy. Something equivalent happened in Africa. Doubtless, the repression was much less intense in Asia, where an important part of the history of the intellectual written legacy has been preserved. And it was precisely such epistemic suppression that gave origin to the category "Orient." Third, in different ways in each case, they forced the colonized to learn the dominant culture in any way that would be useful to the reproduction of domination, whether in the field of technology and material activity or subjectivity, especially Judeo-Christian religiosity. All of those turbulent processes involved a long period of the colonization of cognitive perspectives, modes of producing and giving meaning, the results of material existence, the imaginary, the universe of intersubjective relations with the world: in short, the culture. 11

The success of Western Europe in becoming the center of the modern world-system, according to Wallerstein’s suitable formulation, developed within the Europeans a trait common to all colonial dominators and imperialists, ethnocentrism. But in the case of Western Europe, that trait had a peculiar formulation and justification: the racial classification of the world population after the colonization of America. The association of colonial ethnocentrism and universal racial classification helps to explain why Europeans came to feel not only superior to all the other peoples of the world, but, in particular, naturally superior. This historical instance is expressed through a mental operation of fundamental importance for the entire model of global power, but above all with respect to the intersubjective relations that were hegemonic, and especially for its perspective on knowledge: the Europeans generated a new temporal perspective of history and relocated the colonized population, along with their respective histories and cultures, in the past of a historical trajectory whose culmination was Europe (Mignolo 1995; Blaut 1993; Lander 1997). Notably, however, they were not in the same line of continuity as the Europeans, but in another,
naturally different category. The colonized peoples were inferior races and in that manner were the past vis-à-vis the Europeans.

That perspective imagined modernity and rationality as exclusively European products and experiences. From this point of view, intersubjective and cultural relations between Western Europe and the rest of the world were codified in a strong play of new categories: East-West, primitive-civilized, magic/mythic-scientific, irrational-rational, traditional-modern—Europe and not Europe. Even so, the only category with the honor of being recognized as the other of Europe and the West was “Orient”—not the Indians of America and not the blacks of Africa, who were simply “primitive.” For underneath that codification of relations between Europeans and non-Europeans, race is, without doubt, the basic category. This binary, dualist perspective on knowledge, particular to Eurocentrism, was imposed as globally hegemonic in the same course as the expansion of European colonial dominance over the world.

It would not be possible to explain the elaboration of Eurocentrism as the hegemonic perspective of knowledge otherwise. The Eurocentric version is based on two principal founding myths: first, the idea of the history of human civilization as a trajectory that departed from a state of nature and culminated in Europe; second, a view of the differences between Europe and non-Europe as natural (racial) differences and not consequences of a history of power. Both myths can be unequivocally recognized in the foundations of evolutionism and dualism, two of the nuclear elements of Eurocentrism.

The Question of Modernity

I do not propose to enter here into a thorough discussion of the question of modernity and its Eurocentric version. In particular, I will not lengthen this piece with a discussion of the modernity-postmodernity debate and its vast bibliography. But it is pertinent for the goals of this essay, especially for the following section, to raise some questions. The fact that Western Europeans will imagine themselves to be the culmination of a civilizing trajectory from a state of nature leads them also to think of themselves as the moderns of humanity and its history, that is, as the new, and at the same time, most advanced of the species. But since they attribute the rest of the species to a category by nature inferior and consequently anterior, belonging to the past in the progress of the species, the Europeans imagine themselves as the exclusive bearers, creators, and protagonists of that modernity. What is notable about this is not that the
Europeans imagined and thought of themselves and the rest of the species in that way—something not exclusive to Europeans—but the fact that they were capable of spreading and establishing that historical perspective as hegemonic within the new intersubjective universe of the global model of power.

Of course, the intellectual resistance to that historical perspective was not long in emerging. In Latin America, from the end of the nineteenth century and above all in the twentieth century, especially after World War II, it happened in connection with the development-underdevelopment debate. That debate was dominated for a long time by the so-called theory of modernization. One of the arguments most frequently used, from opposing angles, was to affirm that modernization does not necessarily imply the westernization of non-European societies and cultures, but that modernity is a phenomenon of all cultures, not just of Europe or the West.

If the concept of modernity only, or fundamentally, refers to the ideas of newness, the advanced, the rational-scientific, the secular (which are the ideas normally associated with it), then there is no doubt that one must admit that it is a phenomenon possible in all cultures and historical epochs. With all their respective particularities and differences, all the so-called high cultures (China, India, Egypt, Greece, Maya-Aztec, Tawantinsuyo) prior to the current world-system unequivocally exhibit signs of that modernity, including rational science and the secularization of thought. In truth, it would be almost ridiculous at these levels of historical research to attribute to non-European cultures a mythic-magical mentality, for example, as a defining trait in opposition to rationality and science as characteristics of Europe. Therefore, apart from their symbolic contents, cities, temples, palaces, pyramids or monumental cities (such as Machu Picchu or Borobudur), irrigation, large thoroughfares, technologies, metallurgy, mathematics, calendars, writing, philosophy, histories, armies, and wars clearly demonstrate the scientific development in each one of the high cultures that took place long before the formation of Europe as a new entity.

The most that one can really say is that the present period has gone further in scientific and technological developments and has made major discoveries and achievements under Europe’s hegemonic role and, more generally, under Western hegemony.

The defenders of the European patent on modernity are accustomed to appeal to the cultural history of the ancient Greco-Roman world and to the world of the Mediterranean prior to the colonization of America in order to legitimize their claim on the exclusivity of its patent. What is
curious about this argument is, first, that it obscures the fact that the truly advanced part of the Mediterranean world was Islamo-Judaic. Second, it was that world that maintained the Greco-Roman cultural heritage, cities, commerce, agricultural trade, mining, textile industry, philosophy, and history, while the future Western Europe was being dominated by feudalism and cultural obscurantism. Third, very probably, the commodification of the labor force—the capital-wage relation—emerged precisely in that area, and its development expanded north toward the future Europe. Fourth, starting only with the defeat of Islam and the later displacement by America of Islam’s hegemony over the world market north to Europe did the center of cultural activity also begin to be displaced to that new region. Because of this, the new geographic perspective of history and culture, elaborated and imposed as globally hegemonic, implies a new geography of power. The idea of Occident-Orient itself is belated and starts with British hegemony. Or is it still necessary to recall that the prime meridian crosses London and not Seville or Venice?¹⁵

In this sense, the Eurocentric pretension to be the exclusive producer and protagonist of modernity—because of which all modernization of non-European populations, is, therefore, a Europeanization—is an ethnocentric pretension and, in the long run, provincial. However, if it is accepted that the concept of modernity refers solely to rationality, science, technology, and so on, the question that we would be posing to historical experience would not be different than the one proposed by European ethnocentrism. The debate would consist just in the dispute for the originality and exclusivity of the ownership of the phenomenon thus called modernity, and consequently everything would remain in the same terrain and according to the same perspective of Eurocentrism.

There is, however, a set of elements that point to a different concept of modernity that gives an account of a historical process specific to the current world-system. The previous references and traits of the concept of modernity are not absent, obviously. But they belong to a universe of social relations, both in its material and intersubjective dimensions, whose central question and, consequently its central field conflict, is human social liberation as a historical interest of society. In this article, I will limit myself to advancing, in a brief and schematic manner, some propositions to clarify these issues.¹⁶

In the first place, the current model of global power is the first effectively global one in world history in several specific senses. First, it is the first where in each sphere of social existence all historically known forms
of control of respective social relations are articulated, configuring in each area only one structure with systematic relations between its components and, by the same means, its whole. Second, it is the first model where each structure of each sphere of social existence is under the hegemony of an institution produced within the process of formation and development of that same model of power. Thus, in the control of labor and its resources and products, it is the capitalist enterprise; in the control of sex and its resources and products, the bourgeois family; in the control of authority and its resources and products, the nation-state; in the control of intersubjectivity, Eurocentrism. Third, each one of those institutions exists in a relation of interdependence with each one of the others. Therefore, the model of power is configured as a system. Fourth, finally, this model of global power is the first that covers the entire planet’s population.

In this specific sense, humanity in its totality constitutes today the first historically known global \textit{world-system}, not only a world, as were the Chinese, Hindu, Egyptian, Hellenic-Roman, Aztec-Mayan, or Tawantinsuyan. None of those worlds had in common but one colonial/imperial dominant. And though it is a sort of common sense in the Eurocentric vision, it is by no means certain that all the peoples incorporated into one of those worlds would have had in common a basic perspective on the relation between that which is human and the rest of the universe. The colonial dominators of each one of those worlds did not have the conditions, nor, probably, the interest for homogenizing the basic forms of social existence for all the populations under their dominion. On the other hand, the modern world-system that began to form with the colonization of America, has in common three central elements that affect the quotidian life of the totality of the global population: the coloniality of power, capitalism, and Eurocentrism. Of course, this model of power, or any other, can mean that historical-structural heterogeneity has been eradicated within its dominions. Its globality means that there is a basic level of common social practices and a central sphere of common value orientation for the entire world. Consequently, the hegemonic institutions of each province of social existence are universal to the population of the world as intersubjective models, as illustrated by the nation-state, the bourgeois family, the capitalist corporation, and the Eurocentric rationality.

Therefore, whatever it may be that the term \textit{modernity} names today, it involves the totality of the global population and all the history of the last five hundred years, all the worlds or former worlds articulated in the global model of power, each differentiated or differentiable segment
Nepantla

constituted together with (as part of) the historical redefinition or reconstitution of each segment for its incorporation to the new and common model of global power. Therefore, it is also an articulation of many rationalities. However, since the model depicts a new and different history with specific experiences, the questions that this history raises cannot be investigated, much less contested, within the Eurocentric concept of modernity. For this reason, to say that modernity is a purely European phenomenon or one that occurs in all cultures would now have an impossible meaning. Modernity is about something new and different, something specific to this model of global power. If one must preserve the name, one must also mean another modernity.

The central question that interests us here is the following: What is really new with respect to modernity? And by this I mean not only what develops and redefines experiences, tendencies, and processes of other worlds, but, also, what was produced in the present model of global power’s own history. Enrique Dussel (1995) has proposed the category “transmodernity” as an alternative to the Eurocentric pretension that Europe is the original producer of modernity. According to this proposal, the constitution of the individual differentiated ego is what began with American colonization and is the mark of modernity, but it has a place not only in Europe but also in the entire world that American settlement configured. Dussel hits the mark in refusing one of the favorite myths of Eurocentrism. But it is not certain that the individual, differentiated ego is a phenomenon belonging exclusively to the period initiated with America. There is, of course, an umbilical relation between the historical processes that were generated and that began with America and the changes in subjectivity or, better said, the intersubjectivity of all the peoples that were integrated into the new model of global power. And those changes brought the constitution of a new intersubjectivity, not only individually, but collectively as well. This is, therefore, a new phenomenon that entered in history with America and in that sense is part of modernity. But whatever they might have been, those changes were not constituted from the individual (nor from the collective) subjectivity of a preexisting world. Or, to use an old image, those changes are born not like Pallas Athena from the head of Zeus, but are rather the subjective or intersubjective expression of what the peoples of the world are doing at that moment.

From this perspective, it is necessary to admit that the colonization of America, its immediate consequences in the global market, and the formation of a new model of global power are a truly tremendous historical
change and that they affect not only Europe but the entire globe. This is not a change in a known world that merely altered some of its traits. It is a change in the world as such. This is, without doubt, the founding element of the new subjectivity: the perception of historical change. It is this element that unleashed the process of the constitution of a new perspective about time and about history. The perception of change brings about a new idea of the future, since it is the only territory of time where the changes can occur. The future is an open temporal territory. Time can be new, and so not merely the extension of the past. And in this way history can be perceived now not only as something that happens, something natural or produced by divine decisions or mysteries as destiny, but also as something that can be produced by the action of people, by their calculations, their intention, their decisions, and therefore as something that can be designed, and consequently, can have meaning (Quijano 1988a).

With America an entire universe of new material relations and intersubjectivities was initiated. It is pertinent to admit that the concept of modernity does not refer only to what happens with subjectivity (despite all the tremendous importance of that process), to the individual ego, to a new universe of intersubjective relations between individuals and the peoples integrated into the new world-system and its specific model of global power. The concept of modernity accounts equally for the changes in the material dimensions of social relations (i.e., world capitalism, coloniality of power). That is to say, the changes that occur on all levels of social existence, and therefore happen to their individual members, are the same in their material and intersubjective dimensions. And since “modernity” is about processes that were initiated with the emergence of America, of a new model of global power (the first world-system), and of the integration of all the peoples of the globe in that process, it is also essential to admit that it is about an entire historical period. In other words, starting with America, a new space/time was constituted materially and subjectively: this is what the concept of modernity names.

Nevertheless, it was decisive for the process of modernity that the hegemonic center of the world would be localized in the north-central zones of Western Europe. That process helps to explain why the center of intellectual conceptualization will be localized in Western Europe as well, and why that version acquired global hegemony. The same process helps, equally, to explain the coloniality of power that will play a part of the first order in the Eurocentric elaboration of modernity. This last point is not very difficult to perceive if we bear in mind what has been shown just above:
the way in which the colonality of power is tied up to the concentration in Europe of capital, wages, the market of capital, and finally, the society and culture associated with those determinations. In this sense, modernity was also colonial from its point of departure. This helps explain why the global process of modernization had a much more direct and immediate impact in Europe.

In fact, as experience and as idea, the new social practices involved in the model of global, capitalist power, the concentration of capital and wages, the new market for capital associated with the new perspective on time and on history, and the centrality of the question of historical change in that perspective require on one hand the desacralization of hierarchies and authorities, both in the material dimension of social relations and in its intersubjectivity, and on the other hand the desacralization, change, or dismantlement of the corresponding structures and institutions. The new individuation of subjectivity only acquires its meaning in this context, because from it stems the necessity for an individual inner forum in order to think, doubt, and choose. In short, the individual liberty against fixed social ascriptions and, consequently, the necessity for social equality among individuals.

Capitalist determinations, however, required also (and in the same historical movement) that material and intersubjective social processes could not have a place but within social relations of exploitation and domination. For the controllers of power, the control of capital and the market were and are what decides the ends, the means, and the limits of the process. The market is the foundation but also the limit of possible social equality among people. For those exploited by capital, and in general those dominated by the model of power, modernity generates a horizon of liberation for people of every relation, structure, or institution linked to domination and exploitation, but also the social conditions in order to advance toward the direction of that horizon. Modernity is, then, also a question of conflicting social interests. One of these interests is the continued democratization of social existence. In this sense, every concept of modernity is necessarily ambiguous and contradictory (Quijano 1998a, 2000b).

It is precisely in the contradictions and ambiguities of modernity that the history of these processes so clearly differentiates Western Europe from the rest of the world, as it is clear in Latin America. In Western Europe, the concentration of the wage-capital relation is the principal axis of the tendencies for social classification and the correspondent structure of power. Economic structures and social classification underlay the
confrontations with the old order, with empire, with the papacy during the period of so-called competitive capital. These conflicts made it possible for nondominant sectors of capital as well as the exploited to find better conditions to negotiate their place in the structure of power and in selling their labor power. It also opens the conditions for a specifically bourgeois secularization of culture and subjectivity. Liberalism is one of the clear expressions of this material and subjective context of Western European society. However, in the rest of the world, and in Latin America in particular, the most extended forms of labor control are nonwaged (although for the benefit of global capital), which implies that the relations of exploitation and domination have a colonial character. Political independence, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, is accompanied in the majority of the new countries by the stagnation and recession of the most advanced sectors of the capitalist economy and therefore by the strengthening of the colonial character of social and political domination under formally independent states. The Eurocentrification of colonial/modern capitalism was in this sense decisive for the different destinies of the process of modernity between Europe and the rest of the world (Quijano 1994).

Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism

The intellectual conceptualization of the process of modernity produced a perspective of knowledge and a mode of producing knowledge that gives a very tight account of the character of the global model of power: colonial/modern, capitalist, and Eurocentered. This perspective and concrete mode of producing knowledge is Eurocentrism.\textsuperscript{19}

Eurocentrism is, as used here, the name of a perspective of knowledge whose systematic formation began in Western Europe before the middle of the seventeenth century, although some of its roots are, without doubt, much older. In the following centuries this perspective was made globally hegemonic, traveling the same course as the dominion of the European bourgeois class. Its constitution was associated with the specific bourgeois secularization of European thought and with the experiences and necessities of the global model of capitalist (colonial/modern) and Eurocentered power established since the colonization of America.

This category of Eurocentrism does not involve all of the knowledge of history of all of Europe or Western Europe in particular. It does not refer to all the modes of knowledge of all Europeans and all epochs. It is instead a specific rationality or perspective of knowledge that was made globally hegemonic, colonizing and overcoming other previous or different
conceptual formations and their respective concrete knowledges, as much in Europe as in the rest of the world. In the framework of this essay I propose to discuss some of these issues more directly related to the experience of Latin America, but, obviously, they do not refer only to Latin America.

Capital and Capitalism

First, the theory of history as a linear sequence of universally valid events needs to be reopened in relation to America as a major question in the social-scientific debate. More so when such a concept of history is applied to labor and the control of labor conceptualized as modes of production in the sequence precapitalism-capitalism. From the Eurocentric point of view, reciprocity, slavery, serfdom, and independent commodity production are all perceived as a historical sequence prior to commodification of the labor force. They are precapital. And they are considered not only different, but radically incompatible with capital. The fact is, however, that in America they did not emerge in a linear historical sequence; none of them was a mere extension of the old precapitalist form, nor were they incompatible with capital.

Slavery, in America, was deliberately established and organized as a commodity in order to produce goods for the world market and to serve the purposes and needs of capitalism. Likewise, the serfdom imposed on Indians, including the redefinition of the institutions of reciprocity, was organized in order to serve the same ends: to produce merchandise for the global market. Independent commodity production was established and expanded for the same purposes. This means that all the forms of labor and control of labor were not only simultaneously performed in America, but they were also articulated around the axis of capital and the global market. Consequently, all of these forms of labor were part of a new model of organization and labor control. Together these forms of labor configured a new economic system: capitalism.

Capital, as a social relation based on the commodification of the labor force, was probably born in some moment around the eleventh or twelfth century in some place in the southern regions of the Iberian and/or Italian peninsulas and, for known reasons, in the Islamic world. Capital is thus much older than America. But before the emergence of America, it was nowhere structurally articulated with all the other forms of organization and control of the labor force and labor, nor was it predominant over any of them. Only with America could capital consolidate and obtain global predominance, becoming precisely the axis around which all forms of labor
were articulated to satisfy the ends of the world market, configuring a new pattern of global control on labor, its resources, and products: world capitalism. Therefore, capitalism as a system of relations of production, that is, as the heterogeneous linking of all forms of control on labor and its products under the dominance of capital, was constituted in history only with the emergence of America. Beginning with that historical moment, capital has always existed, and continues to exist to this day, as the central axis of capitalism. Never has capitalism been predominant in some other way, on a global and worldwide scale, and in all probability it would not have been able to develop otherwise.

**Evolutionism and Dualism**

Parallel to the historical relations between capital and precapital, a similar set of ideas was elaborated around the spatial relations between Europe and non-Europe. As I have already mentioned, the foundational myth of the Eurocentric version of modernity is the idea of the state of nature as the point of departure for the civilized course of history whose culmination is European or Western civilization. From this myth originated the specifically Eurocentric evolutionist perspective of linear and unidirectional movement and changes in human history. Interestingly enough, this myth was associated with the racial and spatial classification of the world’s population. This association produced the paradoxical amalgam of evolution and dualism, a vision that becomes meaningful only as an expression of the exacerbated ethnocentrism of the recently constituted Europe; by its central and dominant place in global, colonial/modern capitalism; by the new validity of the mystified ideas of humanity and progress, dear products of the Enlightenment; and by the validity of the idea of race as the basic criterion for a universal social classification of the world’s population.

The historical process is, however, very different. To start with, in the moment that the Iberians conquered, named, and colonized America (whose northern region, North America, would be colonized by the British a century later), they found a great number of different peoples, each with its own history, language, discoveries and cultural products, memory and identity. The most developed and sophisticated of them were the Aztecs, Mayas, Chimus, Aymaras, Incas, Chibchas, and so on. Three hundred years later, all of them had become merged into a single identity: Indians. This new identity was racial, colonial, and negative. The same happened with the peoples forcefully brought from Africa as slaves: Ashantis, Yorubas,
Zulus, Congos, Bacongos, and others. In the span of three hundred years, all of them were Negroes or blacks.

This resultant from the history of colonial power had, in terms of the colonial perception, two decisive implications. The first is obvious: peoples were dispossessed of their own and singular historical identities. The second is perhaps less obvious, but no less decisive: their new racial identity, colonial and negative, involved the plundering of their place in the history of the cultural production of humanity. From then on, there were inferior races, capable only of producing inferior cultures. The new identity also involved their relocation in the historical time constituted with America first and with Europe later: from then on they were the past. In other words, the model of power based on coloniality also involved a cognitive model, a new perspective of knowledge within which non-Europe was the past, and because of that inferior, if not always primitive.

At the other hand, America was the first modern and global geocultural identity. Europe was the second and was constituted as a consequence of America, not the inverse. The constitution of Europe as a new historic entity/identity was made possible, in the first place, through the free labor of the American Indians, blacks, and mestizos, with their advanced technology in mining and agriculture, and with their products such as gold, silver, potatoes, tomatoes, and tobacco (Viola and Margolis 1991). It was on this foundation that a region was configured as the site of control of the Atlantic routes, which became in turn, and for this very reason, the decisive routes of the world market. This region did not delay in emerging as . . . Europe. So Europe and America mutually produced themselves as the historical and the first two new geocultural identities of the modern world.

However, the Europeans persuaded themselves, from the middle of the seventeenth century, but above all during the eighteenth century, that in some way they had autoproduced themselves as a civilization, at the margin of history initiated with America, culminating an independent line that began with Greece as the only original source. Furthermore, they concluded that they were naturally (i.e., racially) superior to the rest of the world, since they had conquered everyone and had imposed their dominance on them.

The confrontation between the historical experience and the Eurocentric perspective on knowledge makes it possible to underline some of the more important elements of Eurocentrism: (a) a peculiar articulation between dualism (capital-precapital, Europe–non-Europe, primitive-civilized, traditional-modern, etc.) and a linear, one-directional
evolutionism from some state of nature to modern European society; (b) the naturalization of the cultural differences between human groups by means of their codification with the idea of race; and (c) the distorted-temporal relocation of all those differences by relocating non-Europeans in the past. All these intellectual operations are clearly interdependent, and they could not have been cultivated and developed without the coloniality of power.

Homogeneity/Continuity and Heterogeneity/Discontinuity
As it is visible now, the radical crisis that the Eurocentric perspective of knowledge is undergoing opens up a field full of questions. I will discuss two of them. First, the idea of historical change as a process or moment in which an entity or unity is transformed in a continuous, homogenic and complete way into something else and absolutely abandoning the scene of history. This process allows for another equivalent entity to occupy the space, and in such a way that everything continues in a sequential chain. Otherwise, the idea of history as a linear and one-directional evolution would not have meaning or place. Second, such an idea implies that each differentiated unity (for example, “economy/society,” or “mode of production” in the case of labor control of capital or slavery, or “race/civilization” in the case of human groups) subjected to the historical change is a homogeneous entity/identity. Even more, each of them are perceived as structures of homogeneous elements related in a continuous and systematic (which is distinct from systematic) manner.

Historical experience shows, however, that global capitalism is far from being an homogeneous and continuous totality. On the contrary, as the historical experience of America demonstrates, the pattern of global power that is known as capitalism is, fundamentally, a structure of heterogeneous elements as much in terms of forms of control of labor-resources-products (or relations of production) as in terms of the peoples and histories articulated in it. Consequently, such elements are connected between themselves and with the totality by means that are heterogeneous and discontinuous, including conflict. And each of these elements is configured in the same way.

So, any relation of production (as any other entity or unity) is in itself a heterogeneous structure, especially capital, since all the stages and historic forms of the production of value and the appropriation of surplus value are simultaneously active and work together in a complex network for transferring value and surplus value. Take, for example, primitive accumulation, absolute and relative surplus value, extensive or intensive—or in other nomenclature, competitive—capital, monopoly capital, transnational
or global capital, or pre-Fordist capital, Fordist capital, manual or labor-intensive capital, capital-intensive value, information-intensive value, and so on. The same logic was at work with respect to race, since so many diverse and heterogeneous peoples, with heterogeneous histories and historic tendencies of movement and change, were united under only one racial heading, such as American “Indians” or “blacks.”

The heterogeneity that I am talking about is not simply structural, based in the relations between contemporaneous elements. Since diverse and heterogeneous histories of this type were articulated in a single structure of power, it is pertinent to acknowledge the historical-structural character of this heterogeneity. Consequently, the process of change of capitalist totality cannot, in any way, be a homogeneous and continuous transformation, either of the entire system or of each one of its constituent parts. Nor could that totality completely and homogeneously disappear from the scene of history and be replaced by any equivalent. Historical change cannot be linear, one-directional, sequential, or total. The system, or the specific pattern of structural articulation, could be dismantled; however, each one or some of its elements can and will have to be rearticulated in some other structural model, as it happened with some components of the precolonial model of power in, for instance, Tawantinsuyu.21

The New Dualism

Finally, for the sake of my argument, it is pertinent to revisit the question of the relations between the body and the nonbody in the Eurocentric perspective, because of its importance both in the Eurocentric mode of producing knowledge and to the fact that modern dualism has close relations with race and gender. My aim here is to connect a well-known problematic with the coloniality of power.

The differentiation between body and nonbody in human experience is virtually universal in the history of humanity. It is also common to all historically known “cultures” or “civilizations,” part of the copresence of both as unseparable dimensions of humanness. The process of the separation of these two elements (body and nonbody) of the human being is part of the long history of the Christian world founded on the idea of the primacy of the soul above the body. But the history of this point in particular shows a long and unresolved ambivalence of Christian theology. The soul is the privileged object of salvation, but in the end, the body is resurrected as the culmination of salvation. The primacy of the soul was emphasized, perhaps exasperated, during the culture of the repression of
Christianity, as resulted from the conflicts with Muslims and Jews in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, during the peak of the Inquisition. And because the body was the basic object of repression, the soul could appear almost separated from the intersubjective relations at the interior of the Christian world. But this issue was not systematically theorized, discussed and elaborated until Descartes’s writing (1963–67) culminated the process of bourgeois secularization of Christian thought.22

With Descartes the mutation of the ancient dualist approach to the body and the nonbody took place.23 What was a permanent copresence of both elements in each stage of the human being, with Descartes came a radical separation between reason/subject and body. Reason was not only a secularization of the idea of the soul in the theological sense, but a mutation into a new entity, the reason/subject, the only entity capable of rational knowledge. The body was and could be nothing but an object of knowledge. From this point of view the human being is, par excellence, a being gifted with reason, and this gift was conceived as localized exclusively in the soul. Thus the body, by definition incapable of reason, does not have anything that meets reason/subject. The radical separation produced between reason/subject and body and their relations should be seen only as relations between the human subject/reason and the human body/nature, or between spirit and nature. In this way, in Eurocentric rationality the body was fixed as object of knowledge, outside of the environment of subject/reason.

Without this objectification of the body as nature, its expulsion from the sphere of the spirit (and this is my strong thesis), the “scientific” theorization of the problem of race (as in the case of the comte de Gobineau [1853–57] during the nineteenth century) would have hardly been possible. From the Eurocentric perspective, certain races are condemned as inferior for not being rational subjects. They are objects of study, consequently bodies closer to nature. In a sense, they became dominable and exploitable. According to the myth of the state of nature and the chain of the civilizing process that culminates in European civilization, some races—blacks, American Indians, or yellows—are closer to nature than whites.24 It was only within this peculiar perspective that non-European peoples were considered as an object of knowledge and domination/exploitation by Europeans virtually to the end of World War II.

This new and radical dualism affected not only the racial relations of domination, but the older sexual relations of domination as well. Women, especially the women of inferior races (“women of color”), remained stereotyped together with the rest of the bodies, and their place was all the more
inferior for their race, so that they were considered much closer to nature or (as was the case with black slaves) directly within nature. It is probable (although the question remains to be investigated) that the new idea of gender has been elaborated after the new and radical dualism of the Eurocentric cognitive perspective in the articulation of the coloniality of power.

Furthermore, the new radical dualism was amalgamated in the eighteenth century with the new mystified ideas of “progress” and of the state of nature in the human trajectory: the foundational myths of the Eurocentric version of modernity. The peculiar dualist-evolutionist historical perspective was linked to the foundational myths. Thus, all non-Europeans could be considered as pre-European and at the same time displaced on a certain historical chain from the primitive to the civilized, from the rational to the irrational, from the traditional to the modern, from the magic-mythic to the scientific. In other words, from the non-European/pre-European to something that in time will be Europeanized or modernized. Without considering the entire experience of colonialism and coloniality, this intellectual trademark, as well as the long-lasting global hegemony of Eurocentrism, would hardly be explicable. The necessities of capital as such alone do not exhaust, could not exhaust, the explanation of the character and trajectory of this perspective of knowledge.

Eurocentrism and Historical Experience in Latin America
The Eurocentric perspective of knowledge operates as a mirror that distorts what it reflects, as we can see in the Latin American historical experience. That is to say, what we Latin Americans find in that mirror is not completely chimerical, since we possess so many and such important historically European traits in many material and intersubjective aspects. But at the same time we are profoundly different. Consequently, when we look in our Eurocentric mirror, the image that we see is not just composite, but also necessarily partial and distorted. Here the tragedy is that we have all been led, knowingly or not, wanting it or not, to see and accept that image as our own and as belonging to us alone. In this way, we continue being what we are not. And as a result we can never identify our true problems, much less resolve them, except in a partial and distorted way.

Eurocentrism and the “National Question”: The Nation-State
One of the clearest examples of this tragedy of equivocations in Latin America is the history of the so-called national question: the problem of the modern nation-state in Latin America. I will attempt here to review some basic
issues of the national question in relation to Eurocentrism and the coloniality of power, which, as far as I know, is a perspective that has not been fully explored. State formations in Europe and in the Americas are linked and distinguished by coloniality of power.

Nations and states are an old phenomenon. However, what is currently called the “modern” nation-state is a very specific experience. It is a society where, within a space of domination, power is organized with some important degree of democratic relations (as democratic as possible in a power structure), basically in the control of labor, resources, products, and public authority. The society is nationalized because democratized, and therefore the character of the state is as national and as democratic as the power existing within such a space of domination. Thus a modern nation-state involves the modern institutions of citizenship and political democracy, but only in the way in which citizenship can function as legal, civil, and political equality for socially unequal people (Quijano 1998a).

A nation-state is a sort of individualized society between others. Therefore, its members can feel it as an identity. However, societies are power structures. Power articulates forms of dispersed and diverse social existence into one totality, one society. Every power structure involves, partially or totally, the imposition by some (usually a particular small group) over the rest. Therefore, every possible nation-state is a structure of power in the same way in which it is a product of power. It is a structure of power by the ways in which the following elements have been articulated: (a) the disputes over the control of labor and its resources and products; (b) sex and its resources and products; (c) authority and its specific violence; (d) intersubjectivity and knowledge.

Nevertheless, if a modern nation-state can be expressed by its members as an identity, it is not only because it can be imagined as a community. The members need to have something real in common. And this, in all modern nation-states, is a more or less democratic participation in the distribution of the control of power. This is the specific manner of homogenizing people in the modern nation-state. Every homogenization in the modern nation-state is, of course, partial and temporary and consists of the common democratic participation in the generation and management of the institutions of public authority and its specific mechanisms of violence. This authority is exercised in every sphere of social existence linked to the state and thus is accepted as explicitly political. But such a sphere could not be democratic (involving people placed in unequal relations of power.
as legally and civilly equal citizens) if the social relations in all of the other spheres of social existence are radically undemocratic or antidemocratic.\textsuperscript{27}

Since every nation-state is a structure of power, this implies that the power has been configured along a very specific process. The process always begins with centralized political power over a territory and its population (or a space of domination), because the process of possible nationalization can occur only in a given space, along a prolonged period of time, with the precise space being more or less stable for a long period. As a result, nationalization requires a stable and centralized political power. This space is, in this sense, necessarily a space of domination disputed and victoriously guarded against rivals.

In Europe, the process that brought the formation of structures of power later configured as the modern nation-state began, on one hand, with the emergence of some small political nuclei that conquered their space of domination and imposed themselves over the diverse and heterogeneous peoples, identities, and states that inhabited it. In this way the nation-state began as a process of colonization of some peoples over others that were, in this sense, foreigners, and therefore the nation-state depended on the organization of one centralized state over a conquered space of domination. In some particular cases, as in Spain, which owes much to the “conquest” of America and its enormous and free resources, the process included the expulsion of some groups, such as the Muslims and Jews, considered to be undesirable foreigners. This was the first experience of ethnic cleansing exercising the coloniality of power in the modern period and was followed by the imposition of the “certificate of purity of blood.”\textsuperscript{28} On the other hand, that process of state centralization was parallel to the imposition of imperial colonial domination that began with the colonization of America, which means that the first European centralized states emerged simultaneously with the formation of the colonial empires.

The process has a twofold historical movement, then. It began as an internal colonization of peoples with different identities who inhabited the same territories as the colonizers. Those territories were converted into spaces of internal domination located in the same spaces of the future nation-states. The process continued, simultaneously carrying on an imperial or external colonization of peoples that not only had different identities than those of the colonizers, but inhabited territories that were not considered spaces of internal domination of the colonizers. That is to say, the external colonized peoples were not inhabiting the same territories of the future nation-state of the colonizers.
If we look back from our present historical perspective to what happened with the first centralized European states, to their spaces of domination of peoples and territories and their respective processes of nationalization, we will see that the differences are very visible. The existence of a strong central state was not sufficient to produce a process of relative homogenization of a previously diverse and heterogeneous population in order to create a common identity and a strong and long-lasting loyalty to that identity. Among these cases, France was probably the most successful, just as Spain was the least.

Why France and not Spain? In its beginnings, Spain was much richer and more powerful than its peers. However, after the expulsion of the Muslims and Jews, Spain stopped being productive and prosperous and became a conveyor belt for moving the resources of America to the emergent centers of financial and commercial capital. At the same time, after the violent and successful attack against the autonomy of the rural communities and cities and villages, it remained trapped in a feudal-like seigniorial structure of power under the authority of a repressive and corrupt monarchy and church. The Spanish monarchy chose, moreover, a bellicose politics in search of an expansion of its royal power in Europe, instead of hegemony over the world market and commercial and finance capital, as England and France would later do. All of the fights to force the controllers of power to allow or negotiate some democratization of society and the state were defeated, notably the liberal revolution of 1810–12. In this way the combined internal colonization and aristocratic patterns of political and social power proved to be fatal for the nationalization of Spanish society and state, insofar as this type of power proved to be incapable of sustaining any resulting advantage of its rich and vast imperial colonialism. It proved, equally, that it was a very powerful obstacle to every democratizing process, and not only within the space of its own domination.

On the contrary, in France, through the French Revolution’s radical democratization of social and political relations, the previous internal colonization evolved toward an effective, although not complete, “frenchification” of the peoples that inhabited French territory, originally so diverse and historical-structurally heterogeneous, just as those under Spanish domination. The French Basque, for example, are in the first place French, just like the Navarrese. Not so in Spain.

In each one of the cases of successful nationalization of societies and states in Europe, the experience was the same: a considerable process of democratization of society was the basic condition for the nationalization
of that society and of the political organization of a modern nation-state. In fact, there is no known exception to this historical trajectory of the process that drives the formation of the nation-state.

The Nation-State in America: The United States

If we examine the experience of America in its Spanish and Anglo areas, equivalent factors can be recognized. In the Anglo-American area, the colonial occupation of territory was violent from the start. But before independence, known in the United States as the American Revolution, the occupied territory was very small. The Indians did not inhabit occupied territory—they were not colonized. Therefore, the diverse indigenous peoples were formally recognized as nations, and international commercial relations were practiced with them, including the formation of military alliances in the wars between English and French colonists. Indians were not incorporated into the space of Anglo-American colonial domination. Thus when the history of the new nation-state called the United States of America began, Indians were excluded from that new society and were considered foreigners. Later on, they were dispossessed of their lands and were almost exterminated. Only then were the survivors imprisoned in North American society as a colonized race. In the beginning, then, colonial/racial relations existed only between whites and blacks. This last group was fundamental for the economy of the colonial society, just as during the first long moment of the new nation. However, blacks were a relatively limited demographic minority, while whites composed the large majority.

At the foundation of the United States as an independent country, the process of the constitution of a new model of power went together with the configuration of the nation-state. In spite of the colonial relation of domination between whites and blacks and the colonial extermination of the indigenous population, we must admit, given the overwhelming majority of whites, that the new nation-state was genuinely representative of the greater part of the population. The social whiteness of North American society included the millions of European immigrants arriving in the second half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the conquest of indigenous territories resulted in the abundance of the offer of a basic resource of production: land. Therefore, the appropriation of land could be concentrated in a few large states, while at the same time distributed in a vast proportion of middling and small properties. Through these mechanisms of land distribution, the whites found themselves in a position to exercise a notably democratic participation in the generation and management of
public authority. The coloniality of the new model of power was not cancelled, however, since American Indians and blacks could not have a place at all in the control of the resources of production, or in the institutions and mechanisms of public authority.

About halfway through the nineteenth century, Tocqueville (1835, chaps. 16–17) observed that in the United States people of such diverse cultural, ethnic, and national origins were all incorporated into something that seemed like a machine for national reidentification; they rapidly became U.S. citizens and acquired a new national identity, while preserving for some time their original identities. Tocqueville found that the basic mechanism for this process of nationalization was the opening of democratic participation in political life for all recently arrived immigrants. They were brought toward an intense political participation, although with the choice to participate or not. But Tocqueville also saw that two specific groups were not allowed participation in political life: blacks and Indians. This discrimination was the limit of the impressive and massive process of modern nation-state formation in the young republic of the United States of America. Tocqueville did not neglect to advise that unless social and political discrimination were to be eliminated, the process of national construction would be limited. A century later, another European, Gunnar Myrdall (1944), saw these same limitations in the national process of the United States when the source of immigration changed and immigrants were no longer white Europeans but, for the most part, nonwhites from Latin America and Asia. The colonial relations of the whites with the new immigrants introduced a new risk for the reproduction of the nation. Without doubt, those risks are increasing this very day insofar as the old myth of the melting pot has been forcefully abandoned and racism tends to be newly sharpened and violent.

In sum, the coloniality of the relations of domination/exploitation/conflict between whites and nonwhites was not, at the moment of the constitution of a new independent state, sufficiently powerful to impede the relative, although real and important, democratization of the control of the means of production and of the state. At the beginning control rested only among the whites, true, but with enough vigor so that nonwhites could claim it later as well. The entire power structure could be configured in the trajectory and orientation of reproducing and broadening the democratic foundations of the nation-state. It is this trajectory to which, undoubtedly, the idea of the American Revolution refers.
At first glance, the situation in the countries of the so-called Southern Cone of Latin America (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) was similar to what happened in the United States. Indians, for the most part, were not integrated into colonial society, insofar as they had more or less the same social and cultural structure of the North American Indians. Socially, both groups were not available to become exploited workers, not condemnable to forced labor for the colonists. In these three countries, the black slaves were also a minority during the colonial period, in contrast with other regions dominated by the Spanish or Portuguese. After independence, the dominants in the countries of the Southern Cone, as was the case in the United States, considered the conquest of the territories that the indigenous peoples populated, as well as the extermination of these inhabitants, necessary as an expeditious form of homogenizing the national population and facilitating the process of constituting a modern nation-state “a la europea.” In Argentina and Uruguay this was done in the nineteenth century, and in Chile during the first three decades of the twentieth century. These countries also attracted millions of European immigrants, consolidating, in appearance, the whiteness of the societies of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile and the process of homogenization.

Land distribution was a basic difference in those countries, especially in Argentina, in comparison with the case of North America. While in the United States the distribution of land happened in a less concentrated way over a long period, in Argentina the extreme concentration of land possession, particularly in lands taken from indigenous peoples, made impossible any type of democratic social relations among the whites themselves. Instead of a democratic society capable of representing and politically organizing into a democratic state, what was constituted was an oligarchic society and state, only partially dismantled after World War II. In the Argentine case, these determinations were undoubtedly associated with the fact that colonial society, above all on the Atlantic coast (which became hegemonic over the rest), was lightly developed, and therefore its recognition as seat of a viceroyalty came only in the second half of the eighteenth century. Its rapid transformation in the last quarter of the eighteenth century as one of the more prosperous areas in the world market was one of the main forces that drove a massive migration from southern, eastern, and central Europe in the following century. But this migratory population did not find in Argentina a society with a sufficiently dense and stable
structure, history, and identity to incorporate and identify themselves with it, as occurred in the United States. At the end of the nineteenth century, immigrants from Europe comprised more than 80 percent of Buenos Aires’s population. They did not immediately enforce the national identity, instead preferring their own European cultural differences, while at the same time explicitly rejecting the identity associated with Latin America’s heritage and, in particular, any relationship with the indigenous population.  

The concentration of land was somewhat less strong in Chile and in Uruguay. In these two countries, especially in Chile, the number of European immigrants was fewer. But overall they found a society, a state, and an identity already sufficiently densely constituted, to which they incorporated and identified themselves much sooner and more completely than in Argentina. In the case of Chile, territorial expansion at the expense of Bolivia’s and Peru’s national frontiers allowed the Chilean bourgeoisie the control of resources whose importance has defined, from then on, the country’s history: saltpeter, first, and copper a little later. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the pampas saltpeter miners formed the first major contingent of salaried workers in Latin America; later, in copper mines, the backbone of the old republic’s workers’ social and political organizations was formed. The profits distributed between the British and Chilean bourgeoisie allowed the push toward commercial agriculture and urban commercial economy. New classes of salaried urbanites and a relatively large middle class came together with the modernization of an important part of the landed and commercial bourgeoisie. These conditions made it possible for the workers and the middle class to negotiate the conditions of domination, exploitation, and conflict with some success and to struggle for democracy in the conditions of capitalism between 1930 and 1935. In this way, the power could be configured as a modern nation-state—of whites, of course. The Indians, a scanty minority of survivors inhabiting the poorest and most inhospitable lands in the country, were excluded from such nation-states. Until recently they were sociologically invisible; they are not so much today as they begin to mobilize in defense of these same lands that are at risk of being lost in the face of global capital.

The process of the racial homogenization of a society’s members, imagined from a Eurocentric perspective as one characteristic and condition of modern nation-states, was carried out in the countries of the Southern Cone not by means of the decolonization of social and political relations among the diverse sectors of the population, but through a massive elimination of some of them (Indians) and the exclusion of others (blacks and
Homogenization was achieved not by means of the fundamental democratization of social and political relations, but by the exclusion of a significant part of the population, one that since the sixteenth century had been racially classified and marginalized from citizenship and democracy. Given these original conditions, democracy and the nation-state could not be stable and firmly constituted. The political history of these countries, especially from the end of the 1960s until today, cannot be explained at the margins of these determinations.

Indian, Black, and Mestizo Majority: The Impossible “Modern Nation-State”

After the defeat of Tupac Amaru and of the Haitian Revolution, only Mexico (since 1910) and Bolivia (since 1952) came along the road of social decolonization through a revolutionary process, during which the decolonization of power was able to gain substantial ground before being contained and defeated. At the beginning of independence, principally in those countries that were demographically and territorially extensive at the beginning of the nineteenth century, approximately 90 percent of the total population was composed of American Indians, blacks, and mestizos. However, in all those countries, those races were denied all possible participation in decisions about social and political organization during the process of organizing the new state. The small white minority that assumed control of those states sought the advantage of being free from the legislation of the Spanish crown, which formally ordered the protection of colonized peoples or races. From then on the white minority included the imposition of new colonial tribute on the Indians, even while maintaining the slavery of blacks for many decades. Of course, this dominant minority was now at liberty to expand its ownership of the land at the expense of the territories reserved for Indians by the Spanish crown’s regulations. In the case of Brazil, blacks were slaves and Indians from the Amazon were foreigners to the new state.

Haiti was an exceptional case in that it produced a national, social, and racial revolution—a real and global decolonization of power—in the same historical movement. Repeated military interventions by the United States brought about its defeat. The other potentially national process in Latin America took place in the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1780, under the leadership of Tupac Amaru II, but was defeated quickly. From then on, the dominant group in all the rest of the Iberian colonies successfully avoided social decolonization while fighting to gain independent status.
Such new states could not be considered nations unless it could be admitted that the small minority of colonizers in control were genuinely nationally representative of the entire colonized population. The societies founded in colonial domination of American blacks, Indians, and mestizos could not be considered nations, much less democratic. This situation presents an apparent paradox: independent states of colonial societies. The paradox is only partial and superficial, however, when we observe more carefully the social interests of the dominant groups in those colonial societies and their independent states.

In Anglo-American colonial society, since Indians were a foreign people living outside the confines of colonial society, Indian serfdom was not as extensive as in Ibero-America. Indentured servants brought from Great Britain were not legally serfs and, after independence, they were not indentured for very long. Black slaves were very important to the economy, but they were a demographic minority. And from the beginning of independence, economic productivity was achieved in great part by waged laborers and independent producers. During the colonial period in Chile, Indian serfdom was restricted, since local American Indian servants were a small minority. Black slaves, despite being more important for the economy, were also a small minority. For these reasons, colonized racial groups were not as large a source of free labor as in the rest of the Iberian countries. Consequently, from the beginning of independence an increasing proportion of local production would have to be based on wages, a reason why the internal market was vital for the premonopoly bourgeoisie. Thus, for the dominant classes in both the United States and Chile, the local waged labor and the internal production and market were preserved and protected by external competition as the only and the most important source of capitalist profits. Furthermore, the internal market had to be expanded and protected. In this sense, there were some areas of common national interest of waged laborers, independent producers, and the local bourgeoisie. With the limitations derived from the exclusion of blacks and mestizos, this was a national interest for the large majority of the population of the new nation-state.

**Independent States and Colonial Society:**
**Historical-Structural Dependence**

The preceding summary of nation-state formation and colonial relations in America allows us to underline that in certain Ibero-American societies, the small white minority in control of the independent states and the colonial societies could have had neither consciousness nor national interests
in common with the American Indians, blacks, and mestizos. On the contrary, their social interests were explicitly antagonistic to American Indian serfs and black slaves, given that their privileges were made from precisely the dominance and exploitation of those peoples in such a way that there was no area of common interest between whites and nonwhites and, consequently, no common national interest for all of them. Therefore, from the point of view of the dominators, their social interests were much closer to the interests of their European peers, and consequently they were always inclined to follow the interests of the European bourgeoisie. They were, then, dependent.

They were dependent in this specific way not because they were subordinated by a greater economic or political power. By whom could they have been subordinated? Spain and Portugal were by the nineteenth century too weak and underdeveloped, unable to exercise any kind of neocolonialism like the English and French were able to do in certain African countries after the political independence of those countries. In the nineteenth century, the United States was absorbed in the conquest of Indian territory and the extermination of the Indian population, initiating its imperial expansion on parts of the Caribbean, without the capacity yet for further expanding its political or economic dominance. England tried to occupy Buenos Aires in 1806 and was defeated.

The Latin American white seigniors, owners of political power and serfs and slaves, did not have common interests with those workers that were the overwhelming majority of the populations of those new states. Actually, they were exactly antagonistic. And while the white bourgeoisie expanded the capitalist social relation as the axis of articulation of the economy and society in Europe and the United States, the Latin American seigniors could not accumulate abundant commercial profits to pay for a salaried labor force precisely because that went against the reproduction of their dominion. The white seigniors’ commercial profits were allotted for the ostentatious consumption of commodities produced in Europe.

The dependence of the seigniorial capitalists of the new Ibero-American nation-states had an inescapable source: the coloniality of their power led to the perception of their social interests as the same as other dominant whites in Europe and the United States. That coloniality of power itself, however, prevented them from really developing their social interests in the same direction as those of their European peers, that is, converting commercial capital (profits produced either by slavery, serfdom, or reciprocity) into industrial capital, since that involved liberating
American Indian serfs and black slaves and making them waged laborers. For obvious reasons, the colonial dominators of the new independent states, especially in South America after the crisis at the end of the eighteenth century, could not be in that configuration except as minor partners of the European bourgeoisie. When much later it was necessary to free the slaves, freedom was not a transformation of labor relations, but a reason to substitute slaves with immigrant workers from other countries, European and Asiatic. The elimination of American Indian serfdom is very recent. There were no common social interests with colonized and exploited workers, nor was there an internal market that would have included the wage laborer, since no such internal market was in the interest of the dominators. Simply put, there was no national interest regarding seigniorial bourgeoisie.

The dependence of the seigniorial capitalists did not come from national subordination. On the contrary, this was the consequence of the community of racialized social interests with their European peers. We are addressing here the concept of historical-structural dependence, which is very different from the nationalist proposals conceptualized as external or structural dependence (Quijano 1967). Subordination came much later, as a consequence of dependence and not the inverse: During the global economic crisis of the 1930s, the bourgeoisie, holding most of Latin America’s commercial capital (that of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and, to a certain extent, Colombia), was forced to produce locally its conspicuous consumption of imported products. This period was the beginning of the peculiar system followed by Latin American dependent industrialization: the substitution of imported goods for ostentatious consumption (by the seignior class and their small groups of middle-class associates) taking the place of local products intended for that same consumption. For that reason, it was not necessary to globally reorganize the local economies, to massively liberate and pay wages to serfs and slaves, to produce its own technology. Industrialization through the substitution of imports is, in Latin America, a defining case of the implications of the coloniality of power.32

In this sense, the process of independence for Latin American states without decolonizing society could not have been, and it was not, a process toward the development of modern nation-states, but was instead a rearticulation of the coloniality of power over new institutional bases. From then on, for almost two hundred years, workers and critical intellectuals have been concerned with the attempt to advance along the road of nationalization, democratizing our societies and our states. In no Latin American country today is it possible to find a fully nationalized society, or even a
genuine nation-state. The national homogenization of the population could only have been achieved through a radical and global process of the democratization of society and the state. That democratization would have implied, and should imply before anything else, the process of decolonizing social, political, and cultural relations that maintain and reproduce racial social classification. The structure of power was and even continues to be organized on and around the colonial axis. Consequently, from the point of view of the dominant groups, the construction of the nation, and above all the central state, has been conceptualized and deployed against American Indians, blacks, and mestizos. The coloniality of power still exercises its dominance, in the greater part of Latin America, against democracy, citizenship, the nation, and the modern nation-state.

From this perspective, four historical trajectories and ideological lines can be distinguished today in the problem of the nation-state:

1. A limited but real process of decolonization/democratization through radical revolutions, such as in Mexico and Bolivia. In Mexico, the process of the decolonization of power was slowly limited from the 1960s, until finally entering a period of crisis at the end of the 1970s. In Bolivia the revolution was defeated in 1965.

2. A limited but real process of colonial (racial) homogenization, as in the Southern Cone (Chile, Uruguay, Argentina), by means of a massive genocide of the aboriginal population. A variant of this line is Colombia, where the original population was almost exterminated and replaced with blacks during the colonial period.

3. An always frustrated attempt at cultural homogenization through the cultural genocide of American Indians, blacks, and mestizos, as in Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Central America, and Bolivia.

4. The imposition of an ideology of “racial democracy” that masks the true discrimination and colonial domination of blacks, as in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. It is with difficulty that someone can recognize with seriousness a true citizen of the population of African origin in those countries, although the racial tensions and conflicts are not as violent and explicit as those in South Africa or the southern United States.

These trajectories show that there is, without doubt, an element that radically impedes the development and culmination of the nationalization of
society and state, insofar as it impedes their democratization, since one cannot find any historical examples where modern nation-states are not the result of a social and political democratization. What is, or could be, that element?

In the European world, and therefore in the Eurocentric perspective, the formation of nation-states has been theorized—imagined, in truth—as the expression of the homogenization of the population in terms of common historic subjective experiences. Nation is an identity and a loyalty, especially for liberalism. At first sight, the successful cases of nationalization of societies and states in Europe seem to side with that focus. The homogenizing seemingly consists basically of the formation of a common space for identity and meaning for the population. However, this, in all cases, is the result of the democratization of society that can be organized and expressed in a democratic state. The pertinent question, at this stage of the argument, is why has that been possible in Western Europe and, with some well-known limitations, in all the world of European identity (Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, for example)? Why has it not been possible in Latin America until today, even in a partial and precarious way?

To begin with, would social and political democratization have been possible, for instance in France, the classic example of the modern nation-state, if the racial factor had been included? It is very unlikely. To this very day it is easy to observe in France the national problem and the debate produced by the presence of nonwhite populations originating from France’s former colonies. Obviously, it is not a matter of ethnicity, culture, or religious beliefs. It is sufficient to remember that a century earlier, the Dreyfus affair showed the French capacity for discrimination, but its conclusions also demonstrated that for many French people, the identity of origin was not a requisite determinant to be a member of the French nation, as long as your “color” was French. The French Jews today are more French than the children of Africans, Arabs, and Latin Americans born in France, not to mention what happened with Russian and Spanish immigrants whose children, having been born in France, are French.

This means that the coloniality of power based on the imposition of the idea of race as an instrument of domination has always been a limiting factor for constructing a nation-state based on a Eurocentric model. Whether to a lesser extent, as is the case in North America, or in a decisive way, as in Latin America, the limiting factor is visible in both cases. As I have shown, the degree of limitation depends on the proportion of
colonized races within the total population and on the density of their social and cultural institutions. Because of all of this, the colonality of power established on the idea of race should be accepted as a basic factor in the national question and the nation-state. The problem is, however, that in Latin America the Eurocentric perspective was adopted by the dominant groups as their own, leading them to impose the European model of nation-state formation for structures of power organized around colonial relations. All the same, we now find ourselves in a labyrinth where the Minotaur is always visible, but with no Ariadne to show us the exit we long for.

Eurocentrism and Revolution in Latin America
A final note of this tragic disjuncture between our experience and our Eurocentric perspective of knowledge is the debate about, and practice of, revolutionary projects. In the twentieth century, the vast majority of the Latin American Left, adhering to historical materialism, has debated two types of revolution: bourgeois-democratic or socialist. Competing with that Left, between 1925 and 1935, the movement called “aprista” proposed an anti-imperialist revolution. It was conceived as a process of purification of the character of the economy and society, eliminating feudal adherences and developing its capitalist side, as well as encouraging the modernization and development of society by means of the national-state control of the principal means of production as a transition toward a socialist revolution. The major theorist of APRA, which made such proposals, was the Peruvian Haya de la Torre. From the end of World War II, that project has become a sort of social liberalism and has been exhausted.

In a brief and schematic but not arbitrary way, the Latin American debate about the democratic-bourgeois revolution can be presented as a project in which the bourgeoisie organized the working class, peasants, and other dominated groups in order to uproot the feudal aristocrats’ control of the state and organize society and the state in terms of their own interest. The central assumption of that project was that in Latin America, society is fundamentally feudal or, at the most, semifeudal, since capitalism is still incipient, marginal, and subordinate. The socialist revolution, on the other hand, is conceived as the eradication of bourgeois control of the state by the industrial working class heading a coalition of the exploited and the dominated classes in order to impose state control on the means of production and to construct a new society through the state. The assumption of that proposition is, obviously, that the economy and, therefore, society and state in Latin America are basically capitalist. In its language, that implies
that capital as a social relation of production is already dominant, and that consequently the bourgeoisie is also dominant in society and state. It admits that there are feudal remnants and democratic-bourgeois tasks in the trajectory of the socialist revolution. In fact, the political debate of the past half century in Latin America has been anchored in whether the economy, society, and state were feudal/semifeudal or capitalist. The majority of the Latin American Left, until recently, adhered to the democratic-bourgeois proposition, following all the central tenets of “real socialism” with its head in Moscow or Peking.

In order to believe that in Latin America a democratic-bourgeois revolution based on the European model is not only possible but necessary, it is essential to recognize in America and more precisely in Latin America: (1) the sequential relation between feudalism and capitalism; (2) the historical existence of feudalism and consequently the historically antagonistic conflict between feudal aristocracy and the bourgeoisie; (3) a bourgeoisie interested in carrying out similar revolutionary business. We know that in China at the beginning of the 1930s, Mao proposed the idea of a new type of democratic revolution because the bourgeoisie was neither interested nor capable of carrying out that historical mission. In this case, a coalition of exploited/dominated classes under the leadership of the working class should substitute for the bourgeoisie and undertake the new democratic revolution.

In America, however, for five hundred years capital has existed as the dominant axis of the total articulation of all historically known forms of control and exploitation of labor, thus configuring a historical-structurally heterogeneous model of power with discontinuous relations and conflicts among its components. In Latin America there was not an evolutionist sequence between modes of production; there was no previous feudalism detached from and antagonistic to capital; there was no feudal seignior in control of the state whom a bourgeoisie urgently in need of power would have to evict by revolutionary means. If a sequence existed, it is without doubt surprising that the followers of historical materialism did not fight for an antislavery revolution prior to the antifeudal revolution, prior in turn to the anticapitalist revolution. In the greater part of this hemisphere (including the United States, all of the Caribbean, Venezuela, Columbia, Brazil, and the coasts of Ecuador and Peru), slavery has been more extensive and more powerful. But, clearly, slavery ended before the twentieth century, and the feudal seigniors had inherited power. Isn’t that true?
Therefore, an antifeudal, democratic-bourgeois revolution in the Eurocentric sense has always been an historical impossibility. The only democratic revolutions that really occurred in America (apart from the American Revolution) have been the Mexican and Bolivian, popular revolutions—nationalist, anti-imperialist, anticolonial; that is, against the coloniality of power and oligarchies, against the control of the state by the seigniorial bourgeois under the protection of the imperial bourgeoisie. In the majority of the other countries, the process has been one of gradual and uneven purification of the social character, society, and state. Consequently, the process has always been very slow, irregular, and partial. Could it have been any other way?

All possible democratization of society in Latin America should occur in the majority of these countries at the same time and in the same historical movement as decolonization and as a radical redistribution of power. The reason underlying these statements is that social classes in Latin America are marked by color, any color that can be found in any country at any time. This means that the classification of people is realized not only in one sphere of power—the economy, for example—but in each and every sphere. Domination is the requisite for exploitation, and race is the most effective instrument for domination that, associated with exploitation, serves as the universal classifier in the current global model of power. In terms of the national question, only through the process of the democratization of society can the construction of a modern nation-state, with all of its implications, including citizenship and political representation, be possible and successful. But under the ongoing process of reconcentration of power at a global scale, that perspective may well not be feasible any longer and a process of democratization of society and public authority may require some quite different institutional structure.

With respect to the Eurocentric mirage about “socialist” revolutions (as control of the state and as state control of labor/resources/product), it should be emphasized that such a perspective is founded in two radically false theoretical assumptions. First, the idea of a homogeneous capitalist society, in the sense that capital exists only as social relation and therefore that the waged industrial working class is the majority of the population. But we have just seen that this has never been so in either Latin America or the rest of the world, and that it will most assuredly never occur. Second, there is the assumption that socialism consists in the state control of each and every sphere of power and social existence, beginning with the control of labor, because from the state a new society can be constructed. This assumption
puts history, again, on its head, since even in the crude terms of historical materialism, the state, a superstructure, becomes the base of construction of society. By the same token it hides the reconcentration of the control of power, which necessarily brings total despotism of the controllers, making it appear to be radical redistribution of the control of power. But socialism, if the word still has some effective meaning, cannot be something other than the trajectory of a radical return of the control over labor/resources/product, over sex/resources/products, over authorities/institutions/violence, and over intersubjectivity/knowledge/communication to the daily life of the people. This is what I have proposed since 1972 as the socialization of power (Quijano 1972, 1981).

In 1928, José Carlos Mariátegui was, without a doubt, the first to begin to see (and not just in Latin America) that in his space/time, the social relations of power, whatever their previous character, existed and acted simultaneously and together in a single and whole structure of power. He perceived that there could not be a homogeneous unity, with continuous relations among its elements, moving itself in a continuous and systematic history. Therefore, the idea of a socialist revolution by historical necessity had to be directed against the whole of that power. Far from consisting of a new bureaucratic reconcentration of power, it could have meaning only as a redistribution among the people, in their daily lives, of the control over their conditions of social existence. After Mariátegui, the debate was not taken up again in Latin America until the 1960s, and in the rest of the world, it began with the worldwide defeat of the socialist camp.

In reality, each category used to characterize the Latin American political process has always been a partial and distorted way to look at this reality. That is an inevitable consequence of the Eurocentric perspective, in which a linear and one-directional evolutionism is amalgamated contradictorily with the dualist vision of history, a new and radical dualism that separates nature from society, the body from reason, that does not know what to do with the question of totality (simply denying it like the old empiricism or the new postmodernism) or understands it only in an organic or systemic way, making it, thus, into a distorted perspective, impossible to be used, except in error.

It is not, then, an accident that we have been defeated, for the moment, in both revolutionary projects, in America and in the entire world. What we could advance and conquer in terms of political and civil rights in a necessary redistribution of power (of which the decolonization of power is the presupposition and point of departure) is now being torn down in the
process of the reconcentration of the control of power in global capitalism and of its management of the coloniality of power by the same functionaries. Consequently, it is time to learn to free ourselves from the Eurocentric mirror where our image is always, necessarily, distorted. It is time, finally, to cease being what we are not.

Translated by
Michael Ennis

Notes
I want to thank Edgardo Lander and Walter Mignolo for their help in the revision of this article. Thanks also to an anonymous reviewer for useful criticisms of a previous version. Responsibility for the errors and limitations of the text is mine alone.

1. On the concept of the coloniality of power, see Quijano 1992a.
2. Even though for the imperialist vision of the United States of America the term “America” is just another name for that country, today it is the name of the territory that extends from Alaska in the North to Cape Horn in the South, including the Caribbean archipelago. But from 1492 until 1610, America was exclusively the time/space under Iberian (Hispanic Portuguese) colonial domination. This included, in the northern border, California, Texas, New Mexico, Florida (conquered in the nineteenth century by the United States), the Spanish-speaking Caribbean area, up to Cape Horn in the South—roughly, the time/space of today’s Latin America. The Eurocentered, capitalist, colonial/modern power emerged then and there. So, though today America is a very heterogeneous world in terms of power and culture, and for descriptive purposes could be better referred to as the Americas, in regards to the history of the specific pattern of world power that is discussed here, “America” still is the proper denomination.
4. On this question and the possible antecedents to race before America, see Quijano 1992b.
5. The invention of the category of “color”—first as the most visible indication of race and later simply as its equivalent—as much as the invention of the particular category of “white,” still requires a more exhaustive historical investigation. In every case, they were most probably Anglo-American inventions, since there are no traces of these categories in the chronicles and other documents from the first one hundred years of Iberian colonialism in America. For the case
of Anglo-America, an extensive bibliography exists. Allen 1994 and Jacobson 1998 are among the most important works on this topic. The problem is that this explanation ignores what happened in Iberian America. Due to this elision, we still lack sufficient information on this specific problem for that region. Therefore, this is still an open question. It is very interesting that despite the fact that those who would be “Europeans” in the future, from the time of the Roman Empire recognized the future “Africans,” as did the Iberians who were more or less familiar with Africans much earlier than the conquest, but never thought of them in racial terms before the colonization of America. In fact, race as a category was applied for the first time to the Indians, not to blacks. In this way, race appears much earlier than color in the history of the social classification of the global population.

6. The idea of race is literally an invention. It has nothing to do with the biological structure of the human species. Regarding phenotypic traits, those that are obviously found in the genetic code of individuals and groups are in that specific sense biological. However, they have no relation to the subsystems and biological processes of the human organism, including those involved in the neurological and mental subsystems and their functions. See Mark 1994 and Quijano 1999.

7. Western Europe is the location on the Atlantic coast to the west of the large peninsula protruding from the continental mass that Europeans named Asia. Fernando Coronil (1996) has discussed the construction of the category “Occident” as part of the formation of a global power.

8. This is precisely what Alfred Métraux, the well-known French anthropologist, found at the end of the fifties in southern Peru. I found the same phenomenon in 1963 in Cuzco: an Indian peon was obliged to travel from his village, in La Convención, to the city in order to fulfill his turn of service to his patrons. But they did not furnish him lodging, or food, or, of course, a salary. Métraux proposed that that situation was closer to the Roman colonato of the fourth century B.C. than to European feudalism.


12. Around the categories produced during European colonial dominance of the world, there exist a good many lines of debate: subaltern studies, postcolonial studies, cultural studies, and multiculturalism are among the current ones. There is
also a flourishing bibliography, too long to be cited here, lined with famous names such as Ranajit Guha, Gayatri Spivak, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Stuart Hall.

14. A summary of the vast literature on this debate can be found in Quijano 2000a.
15. See Young 1995.
16. For a more extended debate, see Quijano 2000b in the forthcoming issue of Anuario Mariáteguiano.
17. On the theoretical propositions of this conception of power, see Quijano n.d.
18. I mean “system” in the sense that the relations between parts and the totality are not arbitrary and that the latter has hegemony over the parts in the orientation of the movement of the whole. But not in a systematic sense, as the relations of the parts among themselves and with the whole are not logically functional. This happens only in machines and organisms, never in social relations.
19. The literature on the debate about Eurocentrism is growing rapidly. See Amin 1989 for a different (although somewhat related) position than the one that orients this article.
22. I have always wondered about the origin of one of liberalism’s most precious propositions: Ideas should be respected, but the body can be tortured, crushed, and killed. Latin Americans repeatedly cite with admiration the defiant phrase spoken while a martyr of the anticolonial battles was being beheaded: “Barbarians, ideas cannot be beheaded!” I am now sure that the origin of the idea can be found in the new Cartesian dualism that made the body into mere “nature.”
23. Bousqué (1994) asserts that Cartesianism is a new radical dualism.
24. The fact that the only alternative category to the Occident was, and still is, the Orient, while blacks (Africa) or Indians (America before the United States) did not have the honor of being the other to Europe, speaks volumes about the processes of Eurocentered subjectivity.
25. For a more detailed discussion on these issues, see Quijano 1994, 1997.
26. For an extended discussion of this point, see Anderson 1991.
27. See Quijano 1998a and 2000b for a full discussion of the limits and conditions of democracy in a capitalist structure of power.
29. Even in the 1920s, as in the whole twentieth century, Héctor Murena, an important member of the Argentinean intelligentsia, proclaimed, “We are Europeans exiled in these savage pampas.” See Imaz 1964. During Argentina’s social, political, and cultural battles in the 1960s, cabecita negra was the nickname for racial discrimination.

30. Homogenization is a basic element of the Eurocentric perspective of nationalization. If it were not, the national conflicts that emerge in European nations every time the problem of racial or ethnic differences arises could not be explained or understood. Nor could we understand the Eurocentric politics of settlement favored in the Southern Cone or the origin and meaning of the so-called indigenous problem in all of Latin America. If nineteenth-century Peruvian landowners imported Chinese workers, it was because the national question was not in play for them except as naked social interests. From the Eurocentrist perspective, the seigniorial bourgeoisie, based in the coloniality of power, has been an enemy of social and political democratization as a condition of nationalization for the society and state.

31. In the 1960s and 1970s, many social scientists within and outside of Latin America, including myself, used the concept of “internal colonialism” to characterize the apparently paradoxical relationship of independent states with respect to their colonized populations. In Latin America, Casanova (1965) and Stavenhagen (1965) were surely the most important among those who dealt with the problem systematically. Now we know that these problems concerning the coloniality of power go further than the institutional development of the nation-state.

32. I have proposed some propositions on this debate in Quijano 1993.

33. Some of the movements include APRA (Revolutionary Antimperialist Popular Alliance) in Peru, AD (Democratic Action) in Venezuela, MNR (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) in Bolivia, MLN (Movement for National Liberation) in Costa Rica, and the MRA (Authentic Revolutionary Movement) and the orthodoxy in Cuba.

34. Eurocentric myopia (not only in European and American studies, but in Latin America as well) has spread and nearly imposed the term populism on movements and projects that have little in common with the movement of the Russian narodniks of the nineteenth century or the later North American populism. See Quijano 1998a.

35. It is this idea that gives Mariátegui his major value and continued validity as a critic of socialisms and their historical materialism. See, above all, the final chapter in Mariátegui 1928a, as well as Mariátegui 1928b and 1929.
References


Quijano: Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America


O’Gorman, Eduardo. 1954. La invención de América. Mexico: FCE.


    New York: ECLA, United Nations.


———. 1967. “Urbanización, cambio social y dependencia.” In América Latina:
    Ensayos de interpretación sociológica, edited by Fernando Henrique Cardoso


———. 1988a. “La nueva heterogeneidad estructural de América Latina.” In Nuevo

    Translated as “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality.” In Globalizations and


———. 1992c. “Réflexions sur l’interdisciplinarité, le développement et les relations
    interculturelles.” Entre savoirs: Interdisciplinarité en acte: Enjeux, obstacles
    résultats. Paris: UNESCO-ERES.

    (95).


———. 1998a. “Estado nacion, ciudadanía y democracia: Cuestiones abiertas.” In
    Democracia para una nueva sociedad, edited by Helena Gonzales and Heidulf

———. 1999. “Qué tal raza!” In Familia y cambio social. Lima: CECOSAM.


    Mariáteguiano 12.
Nepantla


